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THE POLICY DEBATE ON PATIENT CARE
FINANCING FOR VICTIMS OF
END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE*
RICHARD A. RETTIGt
INTRODUCTION
It was Saturday morning, September 30, 1972, barely one month before
the November presidential election. 1-he Senate was in session, hardly a nor-
ral weekend event in Washington. It was rushing to complete action on H.R.
1, the Social Security Amendments of 1972. At 11:30 a.m., Senator Vance
Hartke of Indiana secured the floor and proposed that the bill be amended to
extend Medicare coverage to victims of end-stage renal disease.' This cover-
age would preserve the lives of relatively few individuals, at a very substantial
cost. During the brief debate-thirty mintItes were allocated to the amend-
nient-onlv Senator Wallace Bennett of Utah spoke against the provision.
With nearly half the Senate members absent, the measure was adopted by a
vote of fifty-two "Yeas" and three "Nays."2
The remaining steps of the legislative process were traversed with com-
parable speed. The conference committee of the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee met for only a single day to
consider differences on the entire bill. The kidney disease amendment re-
ceived no more than ten minutes' discussion and the Senate proposal was
accepted in its essentials with a slight modification in one provision. Both
House and Senate accepted the conference committee report on October 17,
and President Nixon signed H.R. I into law as Public Law 92-603 on October
30, 1972.3 The kidney disease provision was included as section 2991. In this
way, the nation resolved an extended policy debate over kidney disease that
reached back more than a decade.
* The author is indebted to james W. Vaupel, Philip j Cook, and Peter Bock of l)nke Univer-
sit\ fo1 their (oUstt octive comments on earlier drafts. Support Iot the research on which this
paper is based was provided by the National Science Foundation (Grant No. Gl-39327) while the
author was at Ohio State University.
The Rand Co)rporation. Washington, D.C.
1. Chronic or end-stage renal disease is that clinical condition reached when an individual has
experienced such a degree of irreversible deterioration of kidney function that. without treat-
ment. death will soon follow. Renal means pertaining to the kidneys, from let the ILatin word for
kidne%.
2. 118 CoNG. REc. 33009 (1972).
3. See Social Security Amendments of 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 426(e)(3) (1974).
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This paper is an analysis of that policy debate, one that deserves our atten-
tion for at least two reasons. First, it is thought by many that the kidney
disease amendment is an instance of the unwillingness of public officials to
withhold financial assistance to an identified set of individuals who would
clearly die without such assistance. Zeckhauser, for example, has argued:4
When risks of lives are involved, an important valUed belief is that. society will
not give up a life to save dollars, even a great many dollars. Rarely is this
belief, widely held albeit mistaken, put to a clear test. When it is, it max be
desirable for society to spend an inordinate amotInt on each of a few lives to
preserve a coinforting myth. Such a myth-preservilg action was taken when
the federal governnent assumed the costs of renal dialysis.
The analysis of the policy debate preceding the enactment of Section 2991
provides evidence pertinent to evaluating this claim that society is unwilling to
sacrifice lives for dollars. Though Zeckhauser's interpretation max be of some
merit, it tends to exaggerate the importance of the "myth." it overlooks the
length of the policy debate over federal responsibility for financing the treat-
ment of individuals having end-stage renal disease, a debate that began in the
early 1960s and was not resolved until 1972, and it overlooks the strong resis-
tance to patient care financing that was encountered at every juncture of the
debate, even though the plight of victims of kidney failure continued to be
dramatized by the news media. Finally, the "myth preserving" interpretation
overlooks the alternative explanation that the 1972 legislation was the practi-
cally inevitable next step in a series of partial federal government responses to
the existence of the life-saving therapies of hemodialysis and renal transplan-
tation.
The second reason for analyzing the end-stage renal disease policy debate
is to consider its implications for other diseases that might be candidates for
catastrophic health insurance coverage. A panel of the Institute of Medicine,
for instance, worried in 1973 that Section 2991 might become a precedent for
extending such coverage to other clinical conditions on a categorical disease-
by-disease basis.' Hemophilia victims, for example, wxould appear to have as
valid a claim to federal patient treatment financing as kidney failure victims.
The policy debate on kidney disease, however, strongly suggests that more
than the existence of life-saving therapy and an identified group of patients is
needed before government action is forthcoming.
4. Zeckhauser, Procedures for Valuing Lives. 23 PuB. POLICY 419, 447 (1975). While I disagree
with Zeckhauser's interpretations of the meaning of the end-stage renal disease decision, his em-
phasis on the importance of procedures is fully shared. [he case of policy debate on end-stage
renal disease, moreover, points out the importance of policx-nIaking pro edures as well as ana-
lytic procedures.
3. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INSTITUTE OF NIEDICINE. REPORT OF THE PANEL ON
IMPLICATIONS OF A CATEGORICAL CATASTROPHIC APPROACH TO NATIONAL HEAtTH INSURANCE
(1973).
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I
BACKGROUND
In the 1960s two therapies-hemodialysis and renal transplantation-
emerged which had the capability of saving the lives of individuals with
chronic (or end-stage) kidney failure. Hemodialysis is the process by which
metabolic waste products normally cleared by the kidney through the urinary
tract are "washed" from the blood stream by means of an artificial kidney.
Renal transplantation is that surgical procedure by which a healthy kidney
from one individual is implanted in an individual with end-stage renal dis-
ease; the transplanted kidney functions as the individual's own kidneys once
did. Clinically, the artificial kidney machine is the first artificial substitute for
a whole organ and kidney transplantation is the first surgical procedure for
transplanting a whole natural organ from one individual to another. These
therapies are non-elective procedures for those with end-stage renal disease;
if they do not receive this treatment they die.
In Public Law 92-603, the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Medicare
health insurance coverage for end-stage renal disease was effectively extended
to more than 90 per cent of the population of the United States. The 1965
law which established Medicare provided health insurance coverage to the
aged-those over sixty-five years of age-and this included coverage for renal
failure.' Restrictive patient selection criteria for hemodialysis and renal trans-
plantation patients, and limited knowledge of this specific form of the general
benefit, however, resulted in receipt by relatively few individuals of Medicare
benefits for end-stage renal disease.
Public Law 92-603, enacted on October 30, 1972, provided Medicare cover-
age to the under-65 population and did so in two ways. First, those individ-
uals under age sixty-five who qualified for cash benefits under social secu-
rity or the railroad retirement system because of a disability so incapacitating
that they were prevented from working became eligible, after a twenty-four
month waiting period, for Medicare's hospital and supplementary medical in-
surance protection. 7 This protection included coverage for end-stage renal
disease.
Second, a substantial number of potential end-stage renal disease pa-
tients, approximately sixty per cent of the total, could not qualify for Medi-
care on either the basis of age or entitlement to cash disability benefits. Medi-
care coverage was extended to this larger group by section 2991 of the Act.
Section 2991 provided that every individual not vet sixty-five years old, who
6. SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 94TH CONG., IST SEss., BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON KIDNEY DISEASE BENEFITS UNDER
MEDICARE 4 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as WAYS AND MEANS, BACKGROUND INFOR-
MATION].
7. WAYS AND MEANS, BACKGROUND INFORMATION 3.
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was fully or currently insured or entitled to monthly insurance benefits under
social security, or who was the spouse or dependent child of such an indi-
vidual, and who was "medically determined to have chronic renal disease" and
to require hemodialysis or renal transplantation, shall, in the language of the
Act, "be deemed to be disabled for purposes of coverage under parts A and B
of Medicare subject to the deductible, premium, and co-payment provisions of
Title XV1117I8
Both renal dialysis and transplantation are very expensive therapies, re-
quiring resources normally well beyond the financial means of all but the
most affluent. A General Accounting Office (GAO) study of the costs of
dialysis, based upon 1972 data for ninety-six center dialysis programs in
eleven states and two counties, and ten home dialysis programs in six states,
indicated the following:9
TABLE I
ANNUAL COST OF DIALYSIS
Ceoier Dialysis (96) Hone Dialysis (1 0)
Total Hospital Non-Hospital
(96) (81) (15) 1st Year 2nd Year
Average
Charge $30,100 $30,500 $27,600 $14,900 $7,000
Range 11,500- 12,800-
49,100 46,800
Source: COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., TREATMENT OF CHRONIC KIDNEY FAILURE: DIALYSIS,
TRANSPLANT, COSTS, AND THE NEED FOR MORE VIGOROUS EFFORTS 40-41 (1975).
Note: Data are for 1972.
The costs of transplantation are also significant. Charges for 1973 in twenty-
four facilities analyzed by the GAO ranged from $5,500 to $20,500 and aver-
aged about $12,800. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
cited costs to the GAO of $14,000 for a transplant from a living related
donor. Included in costs were hospital room, board, ancillary charges, and
professional fees.1 ' The costs of therapy to a given individual can vary sub-
stantially according to the therapy or combination of therapies received and a
number of other contingencies. All methods of therapy are expensive, a suc-
cessful transplant being by far the least costly and most satisfactory mode of
therapy.
8. Social Security Amendments of 1972, § 2991, 42 U.S.C. § 426(e)(3) (1974).
9. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., TREATMENT OF CHRONIC KIDNEY FAILURE: DI-
ALYSIS, TRANSPLANT, COSTS, AND THE NEED FOR MORE VIGOROUS EFFORTS 40-41 (1975).
10. Id. at 43-44.
Page 196: Autumn 1976]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Prior to passage of section 2991, the number of beneficiaries of end-stage
renal disease treatment was relatively small. The number of reported dialysis
patients alive in July 1970 was 2,874; in July 1971, it was 4,375; and a year
later, 5,786." The total number of kidney transplants reported for 1967,
1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971 was 428, 635, 787, 996, and 1,172 respectively.'"
Since passage of the Act, the number of beneficiaries has greatly increased,
although the total number is still a small fraction of the population of the
United States. The number of renal disease patients who had qualified for
Medicare coverage as of March 31, 1975 was 25,066, of whom 20,764 were
still living as of that date. 13 Approximately 60 per cent of the total qualified
on the basis of section 2991. It is estimated that the number of patients alive
and receiving renal disease benefits will reach 50,000 to 70,000 by 1990.14 It
is interesting to note, by contrast, the situation affecting hemophiliacs. Al-
though legislation has been introduced in recent Congresses to extend finan-
cial assistance for treatment payment to hemophiliacs, Medicare coverage has
not yet been made available. Hemophilia is a disease whose central symptom
is serious bleeding. The estimated number of patients is 100,000, of whom
approximately 25,000 are severely or moderately severely affected. These
25,000 patients require continuous replacement of fresh whole blood, plasma,
or clotting concentrates. Replacement materials cost from $2,000 to $5,000
per patient per year. Costs of replacement therapy, and of reconstructive
surgery for the most severely crippled, are rarely covered by third-party pay-
ments. Therapy capable of preventing bleeding episodes is far more expen-
sive and can range from $20,000 to $40,000 per year. 15
The extended Medicare coverage for end-stage renal disease went into
effect on July 1, 1973. The estimated incurred costs for the first year of the
11. See RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE, NAT'L DIALYSIS REGISTRY: SECOND ANNUAL PROGRESS
REPORT, JULY 1, 1969-JUNE 30, 1970 (1970); THIRD ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT, JULY 1, 1970-JUNE
30, 1971 (1971); FOURTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT, JULY 1, 1971-JUNE 30, 1972 (1972). The
national dialysis patient load reported in January 1971, January 1972, january 1973, and January
1974, respectively, was 16.6 cases per million population, 24.4 per million, 37.4 million, and 46.9
per million. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH, 5FH, 6TH, & 7TH
ANNUAL CONTRACTORS' CONFERENCE OF THE ARTIFICIAL KIDNEY PROGRAM OF THE NAT'L INSTITUTE
OF ARTHRITIS AND METABOLIC DISEASE (1971, 1972, 1973, 1974).
12. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S. KIDNEY [RANSPLANT FACT BOOK: INFORMATION
FROM ACS/NIH REGISTRY 1972, at 10 (1972). There are several indications that data supplied to
the American College of Surgeons/National Institutes of Health Organ Transplant Regisl'y un-
derreport the kidney transplants performed in the United States by nearly 50 per Cent. For an
analysis of this problem, see J. Sullivan, The Role of Data in End-Stage Renal Disease Programs
(1975) (unpublished thesis at Hospital and Health Services Administration, Ohio State Univer-
sity).
13. WAYS AND MEANS, BACKGROUND INFORMATION 6.
14. Id. at 2.
15. See Hearings on National Health Instirance Before the House Corn i. on Wavs and Means, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 8, at 2400 (1974) (testimony of Margaret W. Hilgarler, M.). and Louis N.
Friedland).
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program were $150 million for section 2991 beneficiaries and an additional
$100 million for patients eligible under the aged and disabled provisions. The
estimated incurred costs for the first, second, third, and fourth years for both
section 2991 and all Medicare renal patients are shown below. It is estimated
that the annual costs for renal disease patients will exceed $1 billion by
1984.16
TABLE I1
ESTIMATED MEDICARE INCURRED COSTS OF
END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE
(in millions)
Fiscal Year-
1974 1975 1976 1977
Sec. 2991 patients $150 $225 $300 $360
All renal patients 250 350 500 600
Source: WAYS AND MEANS, BACKGROUND INFORMATION 15.
I1
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE POLICY DEBATE
In order to understand how society grappled with value-of-life decisions
posed by section 2991, it is important to recognize that the nature of the
end-stage renal disease issue was clearly understood at least a decade before
the matter was resolved. The federal government did not move in haste or in
ignorance to the decision it made in 1972.
The use of the artificial kidney machine for providing long-term, intermit-
tent hemodialysis for preserving lives of individuals with end-stage renal dis-
ease became possible in 1960. In that year, Dr. Belding H. Scribner, a physi-
cian at the University of Washington School of Medicine, and his colleagues
invented a vascular access device known as a "cannulae" and "shunt." This
device made it possible to connect patients to an artificial kidney machine for
the purpose of cleansing their bloodstream of the products of metabolic waste
and then to disconnect them at the end of ten to twelve hours of treatment.
1 7
16. WAYS AND MEANS, BACKGROUND INFORMATION 15.
17. The announcement of the invention of the cannulae and shunt was made in three papers
in the publication of the American Society for Artificial Internal Organs. Scribner, Caner, Buri,
& Quinton, The Technique of Continuous Hemodialysis, 6 TRANSACTIONS AM. Soc'Y ARTIFICIAL
INTERNAL ORGANS 88 (1960); Quinton, Dillard, & Scribner, Cannulation of Blood Vessels./or Pro-
longed Hernodialysis, 6 TRANSACTIONS AM. Soc'Y ARTIFICIAL INTERNAL ORGANS 104 (1960);
Scribner, Buri, Caner, Hegstrom, & Burnell, The Treatment of Chronic Urenia by Means of Intermit-
tent Hemodialy sis: A Preliminary Report, 6 TRANSACTIONS AM. Soc'Y ARTIFICIAL INTERNAL ORGANS
114(1960).
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Scribner inserted the cannulae and shunt in his first patient on March 9,
1960, and immediately began dialysis. Scribner was so enthusiastic about his
technique that he took ten "how to do it" kits to Chicago the next month,
where he demonstrated for his medical-scientific colleagues the process of pa-
tient cannulation.' 8 Clyde Shields, his first patient, also made the trip. Scrib-
ner's own account of that meeting indicates that there was general agreement
that the cannulation technique was promising but that considerable pessi-
mism existed regarding the biochemical aspects of dialysis. Questions dealing
with the potential patient load revealed substantial differences of opinion,
but most thought the load would be considerable. Efforts to determine the
size of that load were deferred to a later date. "The question of public release
of information and fund raising was not discussed in detail," Scribner wrote,
"because it is just too early to say nuch." 9
On May 19, 1960, Scribner wrote Dr. George M. Wheatley, a vice presi-
dent of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in New York City, to inquire
about prospective patient load data: "It is becoming more and more clear that
by this technique of continuous hemodialysis and the technique of cannula-
tion of the blood vessels, we are going to considerably alter the course of
terminal illness in patients with chronic uremia."2 " Clearly, moving this new
medical technique from clinical research to widespread medical use was of
great importance to Scribner within weeks of his first patients being placed
upon the machine.
Costs also came quickly into focus. July 1960 estimates by Scribner of costs
for treating fifteen patients came to $99,000-$16,000 for equipment,
$40,000 for once-a-week dialysis, and $43,000 for medical personnel.2 Minus
equipment, per patient costs were $5,533 per year. The recognition that
thrice- weekly dialysis was medically more desirable later exposed these esti-
mates as quite low. Even so, it was clear from the start that substantial costs
were associated with this new procedure.
By 1962, cost considerations and the related scarcity of facilities permeated
all discussions of dialysis. Writing in the New York Times about the Seattle
experience, Harold Schmeck called the emergence of hemodialysis "[o]ne of
the most dramatic stories of medical triumph and tragedy in recent history. '22
18. The demonstration of the invention actually occurred in Scribner's hotel room in a special
session arranged by Dr. George E. Schreiner; approximately ten people were invited. This session
w as held during the annual meeting of the American Society for Artificial Internal Organs. The
three papers cited in note 17 supra were not formallyv presented at the time, but were submitted
afterward at Schreiner's request.
19. B. Scribner, Report on the Chicago Meeting (April 13, 1960) (unpublished memorandum
on file with the author).
20. Letter from Belding H. Scribner to George Wheatley (May 19, 1960).
21. Memorandum from Belding H. Scribner to Walter S. Tueslv, Director, Seattle Founda-
tion, Community Dialysis Center for King County (Preliminary Considerations) (July 5, 1960).
22. Schmeck, Panel Holds Life-or-Death Vote in Allotting of Artificial Kidiiey, N.Y. Times, May 6,
1962, at 1. col. 5.
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The triumph lay in the fact that "[a] handful of men and women who should
be dead, by normal medical criteria, are living and leading nearly normal
lives." The tragedy lay in the fact that "because facilities for cure are limited,
inevitable death of kidney disease [was in store] for thousands of others."
Annual costs of treatment were estimated to be $10,000 per patient.
In early November 1962, a Life magazine article by Shana Alexander de-
scribed the dilemma created by the existence of a life-saving therapy and the
scarcity of facilities to provide it.23 Treatment costs were estimated to be
$15,000 per patient per year. The article went on to describe the anonymous,
seven-member lay committee in Seattle which was charged with deciding
which individuals should have access to the limited number of machines after
medical evaluation of prospective patients. Factors identified as important to
the committee in their determinations included the patient's age and sex, mar-
ital status and number of dependents, income, net worth, emotional stability,
educational background, occupation, past performance, future potential, and
personal references. The value-of-life dilemma was thus conveyed in stark
terms to an audience of millions.
At a joint conference in June 1963 between the American Medical Associa-
tion and the National Kidney Disease Foundation, the Seattle presentation
enumerated "adequate funding" and preparation as the first of several prereq-
uisites for a successful hemodialysis treatment program.2 4 Costs, it was indi-
cated, could reach "upwards of $20,000 per patient per year," and initial
capitalization for a ten-bed center was estimated to be $300,000 to $500,000.
The financial workshop report indicated that it "has asked more questions
than it has been able to find answers for at this point." The workshop on
socioeconomic and moral questions, however, headed by a Jesuit priest, put
the problem in clearer perspective: 5
At this moment there are only a certain number of people who are able to be
helped through the technique of hemodialysis. In the immediate future, also,
just a small number of people will be able to be treated. No matter what the
decision of our conferences about the medical and financial factors, the im-
plementation of a full-scale program will take a number of years. Therefore,
we in this country will be faced with the moral problem of having at hand a
method of saving life which is not available to all who need it.
Finally, the implications of hemodialysis for the federal government were
also recognized early. In 1964, the Senate Appropriations Committee indi-
cated that the Public Health Service had the statutory authority to provide
23. Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, 53 LIFE, Nov. 9, 1962, at 102-04.
24. Suggestions Regarding Activation and Operation of Community Hemodialysis Centers for the Treat-
ment of Chronic Uremia, in AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N & NAT'L KIDNEY DISEASE FOUNDATION,
PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER THE TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH CHRONIC KIDNEY
DISEASE WITH UREMIA 20-28 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS].
25. Id. at 51.
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demonstration and training funds for artificial kidney programs. That author-
ity, however, did not extend to patient-care financing:2 6
The Federal Government has borne the cost of treatment for its legal bene-
ficiaries and shared these treatment costs when it has been in connection with
research investigation or demonstration. Traditionally, payment for treat-
ment of illness has been the responsibility of the patient or the local com-
munity. If the Federal Government were to share the full cost of lifetime
treatment for all who suffer from these chronic diseases and conditions, the
financial burden would be excessive.
III
MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE POLICY DEBATE
Six factors played major roles in the lengthy policy debate on patient-care
financing. These factors were:
1. The changing evaluation of the two life-saving medical procedures
-dialysis and transplantation-as they were clinically developed;
2. the changing distribution of power within the medical-scientific com-
munity;
3. the gradual extension of government involvement in renal disease;
4. the evolution of the federal role in health care in general;
5. the importance of identifying and publicizing the lives at stake; and
6. the "sotto voce" character of the policy debates.
Each of these elements deserves close analysis.
A. Changing Treatment Evaluation
The evaluation of a new medical procedure by the medical-scientific com-
munity depends upon a number of factors. Most important, at least in this
case, were the location of the procedure on the "experiment-therapy con-
tinuum," the quality of life provided patients by the procedure, the therapeu-
tic alternatives, and the aesthetic nature of the therapy.
1. The Experiment-Therapy Continuum
Fox and Swazey have suggested that it is appropriate to speak of an
experiment-therapy continuum for any given medical procedure.2" A proce-
dure may be clearly experimental or clearly an established therapy, but new
procedures are frequently in some intermediate postion, moving from the ex-
perimental to the therapeutic. Clinical investigation, they note, involves the
interplay between research and therapy, and the balance between the two
"shifts as the new treatment evolves.1 28 The precise location of a new medical
26. S. REP. No. 1460, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1964).
27. R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL: A SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND
DIALYSIS 60-83 (1974).
28. Id. at 64.
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procedure along this continuum, quite obviously, will have a large bearing
upon the policy debate about how the federal government should react to the
procedure. If it is experimental, then research is clearly indicated. If it is
established therapy, however, other responses might and probably will be
called for. But the position of a given procedure on this continuum at a par-
ticular time is difficult to establish.
Two sources of ambiguity complicate this assessment. First, Fox and
Swazey point out, there are semantic difficulties: "Physicians do not have
standardized and unevocative terms to designate the stages of development of
a new therapy clearly and objectively. '2" No a priori criteria exist by which the
medical community call make such judgments. Second, the role of the clinical
investigator is structurally ambivalent because of his orientation to the provi-
sion of therapy to sick patients and his concurrent commitment to "the
advancement of scientific understanding" of clinical medicine. Clinical inves-
tigators differ markedly in their emotional involvenment in both the investiga-
tive and therapeutic aspects of their dual role. The dilemma confronting the
clinical investigator has been described in this way: "The research physician's
attempt to equilibrate his clinical and investigative responsibilities is related to
a basic problem: determining how experimental and/or therapeutic a new op-
eration, drug, or other procedure is at a given time in its development and
for a given class of sick persons. '3 1 Consequently, among clinical investigators
the "scientist" is likely to emphasize the unknowns and Uncertainties of a new
procedure, to stress the limits of knowledge, and to regard it as experimental
for a longer time than a "physician." By contrast, the "physician" is likely to
emphasize the prospective benefits of a new procedure and de-emphasize the
associated Utncertainties.
The policy debate over end-stage renal disease was affected by differences
of opinion within the medical-scientific community as to where the therapies
of dialysis and transplantation were along the experiment-therapy continuum.
For instance, when Scribner first introduced his cannulation technique in
1960, Dr. John P. Merrill, who had extensive experience with dialysis in con-
nection with the transplantation program at Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in
Boston, suggested that patient weight loss andi mental deterioration were
likely to occur on long-term dialysis. George E. Schreiner, a Georgetown Uni-
versity physician and one of the pioneers in the use of dialysis with acute
renal failure, supported Merrill's viess a Subsequently, many physicians w, ho
attempted to replicate Scribner's work were unable to do so. Charges were
made that Scribner kept his patients alive only by heroic dedication and
energy and not by clinical understanding of the dialysis experience.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 63.
31. This is reported in B. Scribner, supra note 19.
Page 196: Autumn 1976]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
In June 1963, however, at the meeting sponsored by the American Medi-
cal Association and the National Kidney Disease Foundation,3 2  Merrill
changed his position and announced that hemodialysis could be regarded as
an established therapeutic procedure:3 3
My colleagues and I at Peter Bent Brigham and others have used Dr. Scrib-
ner's technique and while difficulties were encountered at first, we have
found that it is now possible to use this method. It is important to emphasize
this fact about hemodialysis because it is no longer in the experimental stage.
It is now a practical method, as far as some physicians are concerned, b\
which to keep chronic uremia patients alive. I believe the problem of
hemodialvsis must be looked at in this light.
Schreiner, speaking at this same meeting, was far more conservative; "let me
emphasize," he said, "that no matter what you have read or heard, there are
problems connected with the use of these techniques, both in a research set-
ting and on a community-wide basis.' 3 4 Thus, the community was hardly of
one mind on the status of hemodialysis. Since the conference considered the
financial questions posed by dialysis, as well as its moral-ethical implications,
differences of opinion within the medical-scientific community entered di-
rectlv into the policy debate.
The development of kidney transplantation also raised the question of
where that procedure was on the experiment-therapy continuum. The impli-
cations of the status of both dialysis and transplantation were addressed in an
editorial in Modern Medicine. 5 The editor, Irving H. Page, M.D., described
chronic dialysis as "an interesting and important experiment.'36 He was excep-
tionally critical of recent initiatives within the Public Health Service and the
Veterans Administration to establish dialysis centers around the country. He
also stated categorically "that it should be perfectly clear that we are not ready
for large-scale kidney transplantation" until the rejection problem had been
overcome. Then, to his physician audience, he argued: "We have a responsi-
bility to help guide other human beings through life and not to hold out hope
of ... a normal life-span when this hope is not justified. 3 7
By late 1964 the debate was still not settled. In an article primarily describ-
ing the Seattle experience with home dialysis, Medical World News quoted
Dr. Norman G. Levinsky, director of Boston City Hospital's renal service:
32. CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS.
33. Nit errill, Ciu eot Statuis and Fit tre Pr ospects in the Treatment of Patients With Chronic Uremia, in
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 37.
34. The medical problems he identified were hypertension, psychiatric problems, metastatic
calcification, peripheral neuropathy, and resistant anemia-repeated transfusions that had raised
"concern among pl-ofessional men in the field." Schreiner, Defiitioni of the Problems hivolved in
Laige-Scale Hemodiaivsii Teatmetit, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 45.
35. Page, Polongationi of Li/c in ,lffloitt Society, MOD. MED., Oct. 14, 1963, at 89.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 40: No. 4
FINANCING RENAL DISEASE
"Chronic dialysis is properly considered a clinical experiment rather than an
established mode of treatment at this time."'38 Levinsky went on to describe
dialysis as a stopgap treatment to keep patients alive while they awaited trans-
plantation or some other form of treatment.
The discussion was not confined to the medical-scientific community but
entered directly into the public debate of the issues posed by dialysis and
transplantation. In 1965, in hearings before the House of Representatives
Appropriations Committee, Congressman Melvin Laird asked a physician wit-
ness, Dr. Edward Kass, "Do you consider dialysis a research program or a
treatment program?" Kass responded: "I would consider dialysis now at the
point in between-I think it's what I would call pilot plan or operational re-
search program." Laird turned to Dr. Theodore Tsaltas, a Philadelphia physi-
cian whose own life was being sustained by self-administered hemodialysis
treatment, and asked him if he agreed. "I believe that chronic dialysis has
gone beyond the actual experimental stage," Tsaltas replied, "and it is now
at the point where we can apply it to save lives. The kidney machine is
no longer an experiment-it can no longer be classified as an experiment
because it works-it is now a scientific fact not a theory-it keeps people
alive."'3
Not only did the medical-scientific aspects of the discussion enter the pub-
lic debate, but political factors affected judgments within the medical-scientific
community. "' In late 1965, for example, Dr. Neal Bricker, then of Washing-
ton University in St. Louis, was elected chariman of the Scientific Advisory
Board (SAB) of the National Kidney Disease Foundation. Reflecting the
priorities of the research-oriented community, Bricker and the Advisory
Board took a series of steps that indicated strong opposition to the endorse-
ment of communiti, dialysis centers by the Kidney Foundation. In October
1965, Bricker wrote the SAB outlining his future plans and made essentially
no mention of dialysis treatment centers. In December, he announced that
the Board had voted to discontinue the newsletter "Developments in Dialysis,"
then being published and distributed under the auspices of the Kidney Foun-
dation. And in January 1966, Bricker and the Advisory Board fired the ex-
ecutive director of the Foundation, who had become controversial through his
advocacy of expanding the dialysis treatment centers. Less than three months
later, howxever, the Board considered the legislation sponsored by Senator
Jackson, which would substantially expand community dialysis centers, and
38. Crucial Testfor Hemodialvsis, MED. WORLD NEws. Nov. 6, 1964, at 97.
39. Quoted on NBC Television news documentary, Who Shall Live?, Nov. 28, 1965 (para-
phrased).
40. These developments are outlined in a letter memorandum from Neal S. Bricker, M.D., to
Members of The Scientific Advisory Board, National Kidney Foundation (Feb. 5, 1966). This ac-
count has been augmented by interviews with participants and perusal of various documents in
their files.
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voted to endorse community dialysis centers.4 1 "What brought us around?"
Bricker was quoted as saying. "Reality. The realities are that there is probably
going to be an extension and expansion of' dialysis activities by Congress, and
if the foundation put itself in the opposition, that would be bad.
42
Not until late 1967, in the report of the Gottschalk Committee ,4 did
both dialysis and transplantation receive "official" medical-scientific sanction
as established therapies. The report stated: "The Committee believes that
transplantation and dialysis techniques are sufficiently perfected at present
to warrant launching a national treatment program and urges this course of
action.'"
44
The lengthy debate indicates that both dialysis and transplantation were
evaluated in reference to the experiment-therapy continuum. Consensus was
a long time in developing. Among the clinical investigators, Scribner rep-
resented the polar extreme of the "physician" committed to providing therapy
to dying patients while Levinsky represented the "scientist" given to seeing the
limitations of the dialysis procedure. Also suggested is the dimension of con-
flict, not fully articulated here, between those committed to hemodialysis as a
major mode of therapy and those who saw it as basically an adjunct to trans-
plantation.
2. Other Issues ii Treatment Evaluation
Another issue in the debate within the medical-scientific community was
the quality of life provided to patients by these procedures. Were these
therapies "life saving" as their proponents argued, conveying to beneficiaries
a new lease on normal life? Or were they merely life prolonging, as their
critics claimed, creating a number of unresolved clinical problems? On this
matter, as well, the medical-scientific community was divided.
A third issue raised by the emergence of dialysis and transplantation, but
especially by dialysis, focused on preventive versus treatment approaches to
end-stage renal disease. The scientifically oriented members of the community
were greatly concerned with the emphasis upon the curative or palliative ap-
proach and urged that there be an appropriate research investment into the
etiology of end-stage renal disease that would lead to effective means of pre-
vention. The basic weakness of this argument was that it involved a trade-off
between the future promise of prevention and the existing reality of treat-
ment. Great uncertainty existed regarding when that promise might be re-
41. Renal Gronp Eases Policy on Dialysis, MED. WORLD NEWS, April 8, 1966, at 83.
42. Id.
43. The Gottschalk Committee was established to advise the Bureau of the Budget on a fed-
eral policy toward dialysis and transplants. See text accompanying note 72 infra.
44. U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON CHRONIC KIDNEY DISEASE 2
(1967).
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deemed, and medical scientists advocating the research approach were vul-
nerable to charges of self-interest in advancing it.
A final issue involved the medical-scientific community's aesthetic evalua-
tion of the therapies. Dr. Lewis Thomas has written of the "high technology"
and "half-way technology" of medicine. The former "comes as a result of a
genuine understanding of disease mechanisms, and when it becomes available,
it is relatively inexpensive, relatively simple, and relatively easy to deliver."
Half-way technology, however, is represented by "the kind of things that must
be done after the fact, in an effort to compensate for the incapacitating ef-
fects of certain diseases whose courses we are unable to do very much about.
It is a technology designed to make up for disease or to postpone death. 45
Thomas categorizes both hemodialysis and renal transplantation as half-
way technologies. Most physicians would agree. Beyond this, especially with
respect to dialysis, many would liken the artificial kidney machine to the "iron
lung" state of treating poliomyelitis. The poliomiyelitis story involved the de-
velopment of a vaccine capable of preventing this Viral disease, a vaccine that
made obsolete the clumsy technology of iron lungs.46 This experience has had
a profound aesthetic attraction for the medical-scientific community. It dem-
onstrates for many the absolute superiority of scientific solutions over tech-
nological fixes in medicine. Attitudes toward the artificial kidney, this author
believes, have been significantly influenced by the iron-lung analogy.
B. Changing Power Distributions Within the
Medical-Scientific Comm un ity'
4
No therapy existed for end-stage renal disease prior to 1960. Those in-
terested in the kidney-its functions and pathologies-were prinarily re-
search-oriented medical scientists. The prevailing view of dialysis among the
research-oriented members of the medical-scientific community was that the
procedure was experimental, the quality of life provided by it wvas highly un-
satisfactory, and it represented the "iron lung" phase of medicine. These
views are still prevalent among many medical scientists today.
45. Thomas, Guessing and Knowing: Reflections on the Science and Techynolog7 of Medicine,
SATURDAY REV., Jan. 1973, a; 54.
46. The story of poliomnvelitis is told in S. BENISON, ToM RIVERS: REFLECTIONS ON A IAFE IN
MEDICINE AND SCIENCE (1967); J. PAUL, A HISTORY OF POLIOMYELITIS (1971): Shannon, NIH Pres-
ent and Potential Contribution to Application of BioMedical Knowledge. in SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MAN: BIOMEDICAL KNOWLEDGE,
DEVELOPMENT AND USE, S. Doc. No. 55, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 72 (1967); Benison, The History of
Polio Research in the United Slates: Appraisal and Lessons, itI THE TWENTIETH CENTURY SCIENCES:
STUDIES IN THE BIOGRAPHY OF IDEAS 308 (G. Holton ed. 1972); Benison, Speculation and Ex-
perimentation in Early Poliomyelitis Research, 10 CLIO MEDICA 1 (1975); Weisbrod, Costs and Benefits of
Medical Research: A Case Study of Poliomyelitis, 79 J. POL. ECON. 527 (1971).
47. This section is based on interviews conducted since 1973 with many of the individuals
involved in these events. The interpretation is, of course, mine alone.
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In the early 1960s, the medical scientists exercised dominance over all the
relevant institutions within which the policy debate over the implications of
dialysis and transplantation took place. For instance, within the National Insti-
tutes of Health key leadership positions were occupied by research-oriented
renal physiologists, and the relevant NIH study sections were dominated by
those who were strongly committed to medical research. The influence of
these individuals extended to the major voluntary health associations, includ-
ing the renal section of the American Heart Association and the National
Kidney Disease Foundation (later the National Kidney Foundation).
The research-oriented group was aided for a time by the difficulties that
other physicians had in replicating the Seattle results. When Scribner and his
colleagues first began using the artificial kidney, Seattle was the only medical
center in the country where such treatment was available. Although the Seat-
tle group was successful from the outset in sustaining the lives of patients,
other groups in the 1960 to 1962 period had difficulty in efforts to duplicate
their experience. Charges were made that Scribner invested so heavily in
"tender loving care" for his patients that the Seattle performance did not con-
stitute a scientific test of the new procedure. From the Seattle perspective,
failure by others to replicate their successful experience was attributed to a
greater orientation toward research than toward patient care or, conversely,
the lack of strong interest in establishing long-term hemodialysis as a reality.
From late 1962 through the mid-1960s, a number of young physicians
trekked to Seattle to learn how to perform dialysis. Frequently, these younger
men were less strongly committed to academic medicine than the renal
physiology research community that dominated the scene. These younger
physicians believed that lives could be prolonged through hemodialysis and
they wanted to participate. The institutional impacts of this were substantial.
A program of delivering dialysis therapy to eligible veteran beneficiaries was
initiated within the Veterans Administration in 1963, and a number of VA
physicians received on-site training in Seattle. Similarly, by the time the Public
Health Service initiated a grant program to support center dialysis facilities in
1965, a number of the physicians heading up those twelve grant-supported
projects had been to Seattle to learn how to dialyze patients.
It is possible to observe differentiation of the medical-scientific community
along four dimensions during the early and mid 1960s. In functional terms, a
predominantly research-oriented community now included a significant and
growing number of clinicians who were providing dialysis therapy. In terms
of age, younger physicians were coming into positions of importance within
the kidney disease field. Relative to major medical centers, movement was
away from the university research centers and toward treatment-oriented cen-
ters located in close proximity to a university medical center. Finally, in spe-
cialty terms, nephrology emerged as a clinical and academic specialty along-
side the academic specialty of renal physiology.
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A similar pattern can be observed relative to renal transplantation. The
surgical techniques of transplantation were established in a few major centers
like Peter Bent Brigham in Boston, Medical College of Virginia in Richmond,
and the University of Colorado in Denver. 48 Important differentiation, how-
ever, followed the introduction of immuno-suppressive drugs for control of
the rejection phenomenon in 1963-1964, and there emerged a number of
major "second generation" transplant centers, such as the University of
California at San Francisco, Stanford University, and, somewhat later, the
University of Minnesota.
What effect did this differentiation have on the policy debate? First, the
differentiation of the medical-scientific community occurred as both therapies
became increasingly regarded as established, rather than experimental, pro-
cedures. Second, the differentiation of the professional community from one
dominated by researchers to one having an increased number of clinicians
meant that there was a concomitant shift in values from a science-oriented to
a patient-oriented view of the clinical situation. Finally, this complex pattern
of differentiation meant that there was an increasing number of "identified
physicians" distributed broadly across the country who were beginning to in-
teract as constituents with the political-administrative community as partici-
pants in the policy debate. In the main, they tended to be advocates for an
expanded governmental role.
As professional differentiation occurred with the development of the two
therapies, the institutions of medical-science changed also. The 1963 joint
American Medical Association-National Kidney Disease Foundation confer-
ence constituted an ad hoc arena for discussing the issues that had been
raised by Shana Alexander's Life magazine article. The conference was spon-
sored by the AMA, an organization not known for favoring government in-
tervention in the financing of medical care, and by the Kidney Foundation,
which tended to be dominated by its Scientific Advisory Board. Although
there was substantial discussion of establishing a series of dialysis research and
treatment centers, the conference adjourned without making any recommen-
dations on this matter to the federal government.4 9 The prevailing view was
that government intervention was not warranted at that time.
In November 1964, the National Institutes of Health held a conference "to
elucidate the technical aspects of hemodialysis in which . . . improvements
could be made."15" Slightly more than forty persons attended and the em-
phasis was clearly on research. Interestingly enough, two prominent
clinicians-Scribner and Merrill-were not present, the former because he
48. F. MOORE, TRANSPLANT: THE GIVE AND TAKE OF TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION 39 (1972).
49. For an indication of the inconclusive nature of the conference, See CONFERENCE PRO-
CEEDINGS 65-69.
50. NAT'L INSTITUTE OF ARTHRITIS AND METABOLIC DISEASES & NAT'L HEART INSTITUTE,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON HEMODIALYSIS 1 (1964).
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had not been invited. In response, Scribner, with support from a local Seattle
manufacturer, hosted a "Working Conference on Chronic Dialysis" one
month later, which approximately 160 people attended. 51 The composition of
this conference and the nature of its agenda indicate a far stronger orienta-
tion toward patient-care problems than characterized the NIH meeting.
These three meetings represented ad hoc responses to the need for in-
stitutional arenas in which to discuss the problems created by dialysis. Perma-
nent institutional changes were also sought. For example, in 1969 a Medical
Advisory Board was created within the National Kidney Foundation, in large
measure to offset the research influence of the Scientific Advisory Board. As
another example, dissatisfaction in the early 1970s within the American Soci-
ety for Artificial Internal Organs with the limited portion of the agenda allo-
cated to dialysis and renal transplanation led to the establishment of the
Council on Dialysis and Transplantation. This free floating group later at-
tached itself to the National Kidney Foundation.
These changing patterns of organization within the medical-scientific
community represent various factors at work. One important element was the
manifest desire of clinicians to address the patient-oriented problems of
dialysis and transplantation in settings that were not dominated by the re-
search-oriented members of the community. Secondarily, they reflect the de-
sire to establish various platforms from which representations could be made
to the political-administrative community. Over time, these changes altered
the power balance among scientists and clinicians and led to increased de-
mands for government provision of treatment services from the interested
clinician community.
C. The Gradual Extension of Government Involvement
In retrospect, one can observe a logical development of federal policy to-
ward both dialysis and transplantation as each emerged from biomedical re-
search and was introduced into patient care. That "logic" can be seen in the
contribution of federal policy from research and development, to demonstra-
tion and training, and then to capacity-building within the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare.
1. Research and Development
The support of biomedical research has long been a widely sanctioned role
for the federal government.5 2 In the mid-1960s, soon after dialysis and renal
51. PROCEEDINGS OF [HE WORKING CONFERENCE ON CHRONIC DIALYSIS (1964) (UniversitV of
Washington).
52. For background on the history of the National Institutes of Health, see S. STRICKLAND,
POLITICS, SCIENCE, AND DREAD DISEASE: A SHORT HISTORY OF UNITED STATES MEDICAL RESEARCH
POLICY (1972). For an official view of organized medicine on medical research see AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASS'N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON RESEARCH (1967).
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transplantation appeared, supporting research programs were established
within the National Institutes of Health.
The possibility of using immuno-suppressive drugs to control the rejection
by the host of a transplanted kidney was suggested to the scientific commu-
nity in 1959 and was taken up quickly by medical scientists engaged in exper-
iments with kidney transplantation.5 The first application to humans was in
1961. Within a short time, control of the immunological rejection phenome-
non in kidney transplantation by inm mno-stu lppressive drugs had displaced
the earlier use of whole-body irradiation in clinical research. In 1964, as a
result. of this work, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives added two million dollars to the budget request of the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases "to start a real program in the
study of ilflmtuological defense mechanisms as they relate to the rejection, by
one person's body, of transplanted tissues from the body of another per-
son."5 4 The Senate Appropriations Cointittee, in that sante year, concurred.
"This rejection phenomenon," it noted, "rather than surgical technique, is
today the most serious obstacle to successful organ transl)lants."' 5 The Trans-
plant hIuInology Program, within the National Institute of Allergy and In-
fectious Diseases, was established ill direct response to the implications of re-
search results and in an effort to pursue those implications.
The establishment of the Artificial Kidney/Chronic Uremia Program
within the National Institute of Arthritis and Metabolic Diseases occurred
more slowly. Scribner testified in 1962 about the need for research funds to
improve hemodialysis, and the Senate did add an additional one million dol-
lars to the Institute's fiscal 1963 budget request "for expanded research in
diseases of the kidney." ' It also recommended that "a considerable portion"
be devoted to further research on the artificial kidney. Although the 1962
Senate Appropriations Committee report described hemodialysis as a "bril-
liant triumph of medical research "5 7 its 1963 report more modestly referred
to it as "an excellent example of practical acconplishment.' '58 Neither the Sen-
ate nor House appropriations committee saw fit in either fiscal 1964 or 1965
to take additional action.
Substantial pressures were br ought to bear upOl tile Congress, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health, and the executive branch (luring these vears to
create a program of research ott the artificial kidney. Finally, in connection
with the fiscal 1966 appropriation, the House recommended two million dol-
lars more than the budget request from the Arthritis and Metabolic Disease
53. F. MOORE, snpra note 48, at 128-65.
54. H. R. REP. No. 13 16, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1964).
55. S. REP. No. 1460, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1964).
56. S. REP. No. 1672, 87th Cong.. 2d Sess. 40 (1962).
57. Id. at 39.
58. S. REP. No. 383, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1963).
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Institute, for "the development of a better artificial kidney than the machines
which now exist." 5 9 The Senate Appropriations Committee, impressed with
the need for "simpler and less costly techniques," added an additional one
million dollars to the House allowance to enable research and development
work to proceed "with all possible speed. 646 But the evidence indicates a
program of research and development for a better dialysis machine was not
established quickly.
2. Demonstration and Training
A thornier policy question arose in connection with funding dialysis cen-
ters through Public Health Service funds. Scribner and his colleagues in Seat-
tle had established a community treatment center in 1962. Through a combi-
nation of support from private philanthropy and community fund-raising, an
active dialysis center was in existence when the 1962 Life magazine article
appeared. In 1963, a Public Health Service grant was made to this center to
assist it in meeting its financial obligations."
The policy discussion generated by this grant dealt with several considera-
tions, two of which were addressed by the Senate Appropriations Committee
in its report on the fiscal 1965 appropriation. First, the committee pointed
out, chronic illness and aging formula grant funds were available "for the
States to use at their discretion for the support of community dialysis cen-
ters"; furthermore, the Public Health Service had the authority under the
Community Health Services and Facilities Act of 1963 to use funds for com-
munity dialysis centers. Second, the committee report made clear that such
funds were legitimate for demonstration and training but not for payment for
treatment of illness.6 2
There was an underlying issue that troubled the Senate Appropriations
Committee. The two grants that had been awarded before 1964, one to Seat-
tle and the other to Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn, were step-funded
over a three year period so federal funds would be phased out during that
time. It was assumed by Public Health Service officials that community finan-
cial support would be established at the end of the three years. The Senate,
especially Senator Lister Hill of Alabama, was skeptical that community sup-
port would be forthcoming. In 1964, the committee indicated that it had
decided against an amendment proposed by Senator Henry M. Jackson of
Washington to provide one million dollars for two additional centers.6
59. H.R. REP. No. 272, 89th Cong.. 1st Sess. 17 (1965).
60. S. REP. No. 537, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1965).
61. See SENATE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, DEP'T OF LABOR, AND HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1965, S. REP. No. 1460, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17-18 (1964).
62. S. REP. No. 1460, 88th Cong.. 2d Sess. 19-20 (1968).
63. Id. at 20.
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In 1965, in connection with the fiscal 1966 appropriation, the House Ap-
propriations Committee recommended an additional two million dollars be-
yond the budget request of $1.4 million for supporting hemodialysis centers.
The committee's report noted that this amount fell short of the five million
dollars recommended by the Public Health Service advisory groups. The Sen-
ate committee concurred with the House in providing a total of $3.4 million
for the support of fourteen community dialysis centers.
6 4
The members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, where
much control over federal government health policy resided in the 1960s,
knew what they were doing. They were prompted to action in 1965, in part,
by the knowledge that NBC Television was preparing, for release that fall, a
documentary program which would contrast the millions of dollars being
spent on the space program with the government's apparent unwillingness to
spend money to save lives on earth. 65" However, the Senate, in setting forth
the legal authority for Public Health Service action, limiting the scope of that
action to demonstration and training, and providing modest funds for four-
teen community dialysis centers, showed a fundamental unwillingness to ac-
cept federal government responsibility for paying for the costs of treatment.
Indeed, the federal government moved to further limit its involvement in
community dialysis centers in 1968 and 1969. The Health Service and Mental
Health Administration, under whose authority the kidney centers program
was then being administered, took action to terminate grant support. A May
1969 memorandum from the director of the Kidney Disease Control Program
to the Administration indicated that support had terminated for four centers,
one other center was soon to go off federal funding, fourth year funding
extensions to the original three year grants had been negotiated with seven
centers on the condition that this support was to be terminal, and fourth year
support was not anticipated for two other centers.66
3. Capacity-Building
The development of hemodialysis centers around the country led to a
stream of legislative proposals for expanding federal government programs
from 1965 onward. Senator Jackson was the foremost advocate of such legis-
lation in the Senate; Representative Roybal, among others, in the House. But
this flurry of proposed legislation literally went nowhere. No hearings were
held on any legislation during the period from 1965 through 1969. All con-
64. S. REP. No. 537, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1965).
65. NBC Television news documentary, supra note 39.
66. Memorandum from David S. Hathaway, Surgeon, Acting Chief, Kidney Disease Control
Program to Administrator, Health Services and Mental Health Administration through Acting
Director, Division of Chronic Disease Programs, RMPS, Director, Regional Medical Programs
Service, Fourth-Year Funding-Chronic Hemodialysis Grants (May 20, 1969).
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gressional action was effectively confined within the appropriations con-
mittees.
Reluctance to see an expanded role for the federal government in hemo-
dialysis was not limited to the legislative branch. In early 1969, the director of
the Regional Medical Programs Service, in a memorandum to the deputy ad-
ministrator of the Health Services and Mental Health Administration, wrote
in response to a request for comments on proposed legislation to support
treatment of end-stage kidney disease:
67
I judge that the major question we should ask ourselves as we review the
proposed legislation is this: "Can we and should we at this time make an all
out effort to establish facilities for the treatment of all patients with end-stage
kidney disease who can benefit from hemodialvsis?" My answer is no.
After recommending a strategy directed at prevention, early detection, and
early treatment of kidney disease, this official described the proposal to fi-
nance treatment of end-stage renal disease through Social Security as "quite
unsound." He cogently summarized his views on the central issue:68
Our present system of health care controls costs in cases like this by setting up
barriers to adequate care by making accessibility and financing difficult or
impossible. The cost in dollars, facilities, and health manpower of a national
kidney program which would remove these barriers to patients with end-stage
kidney disease are so great that for the time being we may have to leave them
erect.
Kidney disease legislation was finally enacted in 1970. The legislative au-
thority for the Regional Medical Programs Service was amended to read,
"The Heart Disease, Cancer, Stroke, and Kidney Disease Amendments of
1970.'69 The HEW kidney disease program initiated in the chronic diseases
division of the Public Health Service in 1965 was now legally lodged in the
Regional Medical Programs Service, where it had been administratively
lodged since 1969. This legislation established a means whereby community
dialysis centers could receive financial support through the fifty-five regions
of the Service. Policy control was centralized, but funds for centers were allo-
cated on a decentralized basis through the regions. The net effect of this
arrangement was to increase dialysis capacity at the local community level,
even though there remained great reluctance at the highest levels of the fed-
eral government to adopt legislation that would provide directly for patient-
care financing.
The apparent progression from research and development through dem-
67. Memorandum fiom Stanley W. Olsen, M.D., Director, RMPS to Irving Lewis, Deputy
Administrator, HSMHA, Comments on Proposal for Legislation to Support Treatment for End-
Stage Kidney Disease (April 22, 1969).
68. Id.
69. Pub. L. No. 91-515, § 101, 84 Stat. 1297 (1970) (emphasis added).
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onstration and training to capacity-building is obviously a reconstruction of
events. The "technical logic" of HEW policy development looks more rational
in retrospect than it did at the time. It is true, however, that federal health
policy within the statutory framework of the Public Health Service Act was
primarily oriented toward medical research while concurrently engaged in a
search for effective means to bring the results of research into medical prac-
tice. Within this framework, policy consistently stopped short of assuming a
federal government role for payment of patient treatment costs. Policy toward
end-stage renal disease was clearly constrained by these broader consider-
ations.
4. The Veterans Administration
The United States Government did assume responsibility for financing
treatment for veterans who were eligible for medical benefits from the Vet-
erans Administration. In 1963, the VA announced the initiation of a program
to establish dialysis units in thirty VA hospitals around the country.7 " This
was done over the next few years and by July 1, 1972, the VA was dialyzing
16 per cent of the total reported dialysis patients in the country.
71
The VA reached the decision to provide dialysis treatment largely within
its own organization. It did request apportionment of construction funds for
refurbishing hospitals to create dialysis units, however, from the Bureau of
the Budget in 1965, a request which prompted much discussion within the
Bureau about its implications. Consultations between Budget officials and the
Office of Science and Technology led to a decision, implemented in 1966, to
establish a committee of experts to advise the Bureau on government-wide
policy toward dialysis and transplantation. This group, known as the Gotts-
chalk Committee, after its chairman, Dr. Carl W. Gottschalk, of the University
of North Carolina, issued its report in September 1967.72 Among other
things, the report provided the Bureau of the Budget with a basis to urge
combined dialysis and transplantation units within VA hospitals and to pro-
mote home dialysis-a less costly mode of treatment-as an alternative to
hospital-based dialysis. The legal basis of VA action in providing dialysis
treatment was clear. To reverse the VA policy decision once it had been made
would have been a momentous political task. Even so, the VA action was
scrutinized by the Bureau of the Budget and stimulated that agency to ex-
plore more fully the policy implications of available treatment for end-stage
renal disease.
70. CONFERENCE PROCFEDINGS 67.
71. RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE, NAT'L DIALYSIS REGISTRY: FOURTH ANNUAL PROGRESS RE-
PORT. supra note I], at 5, 14.
72. U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, supra note 44.
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D. The Evolution of the Federal Goverment's Role in Health
The policy debate on payment for treatment of end-stage renal disease
parallelled the larger debate about the appropriate role of the federal gov-
ernment in the provision of health services generally. This larger debate,
moreover, occurred not with respect to the Public Health Service or the Vete-
rans Administration but with respect to the Social Security system. In 1965,
Congress added titles XVIII and XIX to the Social Security Act,7 3 thus estab-
lishing Medicare and Medicaid programs and the principle that the aged and
indigent deserved government-financed health insurance. This major initia-
tive in federal health policy was necessary, but not sufficient, to provide a
statutory basis for patient-care financing for end-stage renal disease.
In 1967, the Gottschalk Committee recommended financing patient care
for end-stage kidney disease patients through an amendment to title XVIII
(Medicare) of the Social Security Act.7 4 The Committee argued that the John-
son administration's recommendation that the disabled be aided should be the
basis for payment for kidney disease patients, although the disability recom-
mendation was not enacted in 1967. The disability recommendation did re-
sult, however, in the undertaking of a study within the Social Security Ad-
ministration in 1968. This study laid the groundwork for providing Medicare
health insurance benefits to the most severly disabled. 75 The provision of such
benefits did not actually occur, however, until the passage of the Social Se-
curity Amendments of 1972, the same legislation that included section 2991.76
The language of section 2991 reflects the importance of this expansion of
the federal health insurance role. After stipulating the conditions of eligibility
-under sixty-five, fully or currently insured or entitled to monthly benefits,
medically determined to have chronic renal disease-the provision said such
individuals shall be deemed to be disabled for purposes of coverage under
Medicare. It is unclear what formula would have been used for renal diseases
if the expansion of Medicare benefits to the disabled had not been occurring
simultaneously.
Senator Russell B. Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, was
then, as now, advocating health insurance for catastrophic illness. Kidney dis-
ease was seen as a catastrophic illness, severly depleting or exhausting the
73. See T. MARMOR, [HE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (1970).
74. U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, supra note 44, at 1, 14, 85-99. The committee was asked to
do a cost-effectiveness study of how to provide treatment, not a cost-benefit stud) of whether to
provide it. Bureau of the Budget officials saw the former question as one to which experts could
bring their competence, but the latter was a matter to be decided by senior policy officials. One
factor apparently motivating the Bureau was that a program for dialysis was seen by it and the
White House as a potential post-Vietnam spending initiative if peace should break out. Interview
with Carl W. Gottschalk, M.D., in Chapel Hill, North Carolina (April 16, 1975).
75. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE DISABLED, HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE
DISABLED UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY (1969).
76. WAYS AND MEANS, BACKGROUND INFORMATION 2-6.
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financial resources of nearly all of those who required therapy. 77 Therefore,
in addition to being included under the general language of the disability
provision, financing of treatment for end-stage renal disease was also seen as
the first step toward providing catastrophic medical insurance through Medi-
care.
As long as kidney disease programs were authorized and funded under
the authority of the Public Health Service Act, it was possible to confine the
government's responsibility to activities that stopped short of patient-care
financing. To bridge the gap, it was necessary to shift the context of the pol-
icy debate from that framework to that provided by Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act, but even this was not sufficient to ensure the commitment made
in section 2991. The ability of the Congress and its staff to relate end-stage
renal disease to disability and prospectively to catastrophic health insurance
was also necessary.
E. The Importance of Identified Lives
The policy debate which preceded the enactment of section 2991 does not
reveal an automatic reflexive response by the government to the victims of
end-stage renal disease. Rather, it suggests a "tipping process" at work. 78 It
was necessary for the cumulative effect of an increasing number of govern-
ment programs to be felt, as discussed above. Moreover, it appears that wide-
spread publicity of lives lost for the lack of scarce medical resources was
necessary, including specific dramatization of identified lives at stake. Finally,
the number of patients being kept alive had to increase to the point where
they simply could not be ignored.
During the 1960s and early 1970s a substantial stream of newspaper and
television coverage publicized the plight of individuals with end-stage kidney
disease. Two major, early examples are the 1962 magazine article and 1965
NBC documentary mentioned above. Scribner thought that the effects of this
publicity would be immediate and would generate intense public demand for
a strong federal government commitment to providing treatment for those
with chronic kidney failure. The limited response in both cases came as a great
surprise to him. 79 The effect of such publicity was obviously cumulative, not
immediate, in its influence on policy.
77. 118 CONG. REC. 33008 (1972).
78. Tipping refers to the process which is said to occur "when some recognizable minority
group in a neighborhood reaches a size that motivates the other residents to begin leaving." See
Schelling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
ECONOMIC LIFE 157 (A. Pascal ed. 1972). See also T. SCHELLING, MODELS OF SEGREGATION (1969).
The concept, as applied here, refers to the cumulative process by which a series of incremental
policy changes lead to a threshold-crossing major change as was the case in the enactment of sec-
tion 2991.
79. Interview with Belding H. Scribner, M.D., Seattle, Washington (Aug. 8, 1966).
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Publicity included dramatization of particular identified lives. In 1965, Dr.
Theodore Tsaltas, the Philadelphia physician who was dialyzing himself,
testified, with substantial emotional impact, before the House Committee
on Appropriations, testimony later seen on the NBC TV documentary."' In
1966, on a visit to Seattle, Representative John E. Fogarty, chairman of the
House committee, observed a patient dialyzing himself in his home. A New
York City resident testified and was dialyzed before the House Ways and
Means Committee in November 1971,81 a demonstration which apparently
contributed to the willingness of Representative Wilbur Mills to support a
kidney disease amendment to Medicare.8 2 Without question, the publicity and
dramatization of these identified lives affected the policy debate, although the
extent of their influence with legislators at any given time is unclear.
The number of patients undergoing dialysis grew steadily prior to the
1972 legislation. The Gottschalk Committee had data on 247 individuals who
had begun dialysis treatment in Public Health Service supported programs
from 1960 to March 1967, of whom forty-two, or 17 per cent, had died.8 3
The committee estimated that this number amounted to one-fourth to one-
third of all those who had begun treatment since 1960, indicating a total of
750 to 1,000 patients. Using the 17 per cent mortality rate, the estimate was
that approximately 620 to 830 dialysis patients were alive in March 1967. Data
from the National Dialysis Registry indicate that the number of patients being
kept alive on dialysis had increased to 2,874 by June 30, 1970 and to 5,786
two years later.
8 4
An interesting question for future research is: When and under what cir-
cumstances does the number of identified lives become so large that patient-
care financing becomes an imperative? As noted earlier, the victims of some
other deadly conditions including, most notably, hemophiliacs, have not been
treated as generously by the government as the victims of end-stage renal
disease.
F. The "Sotto Voce" Character of the Policy Debate
Though the plight of the victims of chronic kidney failure was kept before
the public by both local and national newspapers, magazines, and broadcast
80. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4,
at 605 (1965) (statement of Dr. Theodore Tsaltas).
81. Hearings on National Health Insurance Proposals Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 1524-46 (1971) (statement of Shep Glazer, Vice President, National
Association of Patients on Hemodialysis).
82. Interview with Charles L. Plante, Washington, D.C. (July 12, 1973), and William Fuller-
ton, Washington, D.C. (July 12, 1973).
83. U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, supra note 44, at 47-49. The Committee also had data on
231 Veterans Administration patients who had begun dialysis since 1963, of whom forty-seven
had died at the time of the report.
84. RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE, supra note 11.
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media, the policy debate per se was not very public in character. The issues in
the debate were clearly understood and vigorously discussed, as indicated
above, but the debate itself had low public visibility and limited public partici-
pation. Let us summarize the above discussion in this regard.
All the policy issues were extensively discussed within the medical-scientific
community. The settings for these discussions were controlled by the medical,
scientific, and voluntary health organizations concerned with renal disease.
These organizations were dominated by the research community in the early
1960s, but clinicians came to play an increasingly important role as time
passed. Nevertheless, these discussions within the medical-scientific commu-
nity were basically inaccessible to the public.
Congressional discussions of the issues posed by end-stage kidney disease
were confined for many years to the appropriations committees of the House
and Senate. Existing legislative authority was deemed adequate for the range
of acceptable policy responses until 1970. No kidney disease legislation was
enacted until that year, though numerous bills were proposed from 1965 on-
ward. Nor was there any full discussion of the issues in congressional com-
mittee hearings on kidney disease during the policy debate. Not even the
1972 legislation, as we shall see in a moment, received thorough legislative
attention.
Executive branch discussions of the policy issues were often focused on
specific budgetary questions, matters of very low public visibility. The various
legislative proposals introduced in the Congress generated important analyses
within the executive branch, but the absence of legislative hearings meant that
the positions developed were never publicly articulated. The effort to address
the policy issues through the Gottschalk Committee, moreover, was deliber-
ately kept at a very low profile and the release of its report to the public was
done in an almost surreptitious manner. 8- The executive branch displayed no
enthusiasm at all for a public discussion of the issues.
The policy debate on patient-care financing for kidney disease was carried
out mainly within the inner councils of the medical-scientific community and
the political-governmental system. Two explanations are suggested for this
"sotto voce" character of the debate. One hypothesis is that there existed a
basic asymmetry in the relative power of the opponents and proponents of
federal government financing of treatment costs with opponents controlling
access to the formal decision-making agenda of government for an extended
time and thus able to prevent the isste from being considered. Alternatively,
it is possible to argue that both opponents and proponents were reluctant to
have this issue fully considered in a public debate, fearing perhaps that it was
too divisive for the polity to handle. The evidence supports both propositions
85. See Blamphin, Capital Rounds, MED. WORLD NEws, Nov. 24, 1967, at 77.
Page 196: Autumn 1976]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
to some extent, suggesting that this particular "value of life" issue posed great
difficulties for the normal functioning of policy formation processes.
IV
RESOLUTION OF THE DEBATE
This analysis has discussed a number of the factors which influenced the
extended policy debate on patient-care financing for end-stage renal disease.
The evidence reveals great reluctance by the government to assume the fi-
nancial responsibility for paying patient treatment costs. In 1972 the policy
debate was finally and suddenly resolved.
In early 1971, at the outset of the Ninety-second Congress, the Nixon
Administration proposed a number of major amendments to the Social Se-
curity Act. The bill which was introduced in the House of Representatives as
H.R. I dealt with consolidation of fifty-four federal-state programs for the
needy aged, blind, and disabled; the establishment of more effective cost con-
trols on Medicare and Medicaid; the provision of health care to Medicare and
Medicaid recipients through health maintenance organizations; and various
modifications of the Social Security benefit structure. 86 But "by far the most
significant and the most needed provisions of H.R. 1," in the words of Elliott
Richardson, then Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, were "those
which reform the family welfare system and replace it with a new national
program.
87
The welfare reform debate was very protracted, especially in the Senate. 8
In addition to the Nixon Administration's proposal, Louisiana Senator Russell
B. Long, chairman of the Finance Committee, was advocating a more conser-
vative welfare reform bill8 " and Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut was
proposing a more liberal version. " ' None of the three parties had the votes to
prevail over the other two, nor were any two able to compromise differences.
By midsummer 1972, it was clear that welfare reform legislation had effec-
tively been killed.
The prolonged debate on welfare reform had consumed so much time
that passage of any bill was threatened. Since H.R. I contained many impor-
tant provisions apart from welfare reform, no one wished the Congress to fail
in enacting legislation. This commitment to pass some kind of bill was rein-
forced by the desire to avoid the experience of 1970, when the House had
86. S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1972) for the bill as it came to the Senate floor.
87. Hearings on Social Security Amendments of 1971 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 30 (1971).
88. See M. BOWLER, THE NIXON GUARANTEED INCOME PROPOSAL: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS IN
POLICY CHANGE (1974).
89. See S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 449-500 (1972).
90. See id. at 1247-82.
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refused to meet with the Senate in a joint conference committee late in the
session because there was so little time to negotiate important differences
prior to the November election. 9' This time, both House and Senate were
determined to have legislation on the President's desk before election day,
November 7, 1972.
At no point in the extensive hearings on H.R. 1 did either the House or
the Senate hear testimony on renal disease. It is true, however, that in
November 1971 the House Ways and Means Committee, in connection with
hearings on national health insurance, heard testimony which urged that
end-stage renal disease be included in any such program. 92 Moreover, in De-
cember, Representative Mills introduced a bill that would have amended the
Social Security Act to provide patient-care financing for chronic renal disease
patients, "a a bill more notable for signaling Mr. Mills's intentions than for
the care with which it was drafted. But neither the Ways and Means Com-
mittee hearing nor Mills's legislative proposal was part of the legislative his-
tory of H.R. 1. Furthermore, there was no activity within the Senate Finance
Committee during this time which remotely related end-stage renal disease
to H.R. 1.
The end-stage renal disease amendment was not considered until the pro-
visions of the entire H.R. 1 bill were being debated seriatim on the Senate
floor. On September 30, as indicated at the beginning of this article, Senator
Vance Hartke proposed an amendment on chronic renal disease. His pro-
posal was accepted with little debate by the Senate and with a slight change in
one provision by the House and Senate conference committee. After the Sen-
ate and House approved the conference committee report, President Nixon
signed H.R. 1 on October 30, 1972.
A number of interesting arguments were raised in the Senate floor debate,
most of them by Senator Hartke. He argued that the nation spent billions for
transportation, outer space, defense, cosmetics, and appliances, "but when it
comes to maintaining our health, we revert to the primitive values and at-
titudes of the distant past."9 4 A tragic irony of the 20th century was that
people were dying because access to proper medical care was limited by cost.
An extension of that irony was that medical research had produced "two
proven lifesaving therapies for terminal patients," but that only a small per-
centage of the potential beneficiaries received them.9 5 The fundamental ques-
tion was this: "How do we explain that the difference between life and death
91. Interview with Irwin Wolkstein, Bureau of Health Insurance, Social Security Administra-
tion, Baltimore, Maryland (Sept. 10, 1973).
92. Hearings on National Health Insurance Proposals Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 1524-46 (1971).
93. See H.R. 12043, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
94. 118 CONG. REC. 33003 (1972).
95. Id.
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is a matter of dollars? How do we explain that those who are wealthy have a
greater chance to enjoy a longer life than those who are not?"9 The Senator's
recommendation was to "begin to set our national priorities straight by under-
taking a national effort to bring kidney disease treatment within the reach of
all those in need.
' 97
The central issue was reiterated by several other Senators. Senator Jack-
son, Democrat of Washington, thought it was-"a great tragedy, in a nation as
affluent as ours, that we have to consciously make a decision all over America
as to the people who will live and the people who will die."98 He recalled the
Seattle experience in allocating scarce dialysis machines, and believed that the
nation could do better. Senator Chiles, Democrat of Florida, honorary chair-
man of the Florida Kidney Foundation, Inc. that year, reiterated the same
point:9 9
... in this country with so much affluence, to think that there are people who
will die this year merely because we do not have enough of these machines and
do not have enough dollars, so that we do have to make the choice of who
will live and who will die, when we already know we have a good treatment
that can succeed and keep these people alive, while we are working out other
improvements in transplants, finding cures, and everything else necessary.
This should not happen in this country.
The notable point was that the reluctance to sacrifice lives for dollars was
articulated not as an absolute value, but as one that bore some relation to
national wealth or affluence.
Still, proponents of the amendment were not indifferent to the costs of
treatment. Senators Hartke, Jackson, and Magnuson, Democrat of Washing-
ton, all suggested that the costs of dialysis would continue to go down with
new advances in the technology of the artificial kidney. Hartke also argued
for kidney transplantation in glowing terms and looked forward to substantial
cost reductions for this surgical procedure. Costs of dialysis, moreover, could
be offset in Hartke's view by the prospect that 60 per cent could return to
work with retraining while "most of the remaining 40 per cent need no re-
training whatsoever.""" In short, there was reason to be optimistic in unit cost
terms.
Aggregate costs to the nation, moreover, were seen as manageable. Pre-
liminary estimates, Hartke indicated, were that first year costs would be about
$75 million, and the fourth year cost about $250 million. He also suggested
that the $90 to $110 million the amendment would cost annually "is a minor
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 33007.
99. Id. at 33008.
100. ld. at 33004.
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cost to maintain life." He did not reconcile these differing numbers. "It is
possible," he suggested, "that these costs could be covered by the slight actuar-
ial surplus in the hospital insurance trust fund and the slight reduction in
costs now estimated for the regular medicare program for the disabled."1' 1
But if a medicare tax increase "of a small amount is necessary, it would be
quite normal," he said. 1 2
Senator Wallace Bennett, Republican of Utah, was the only one who spoke
in opposition to the amendment. He thought the Senate was about to vote
$100 million to $250 million for dialysis and transplantation, but presented
no more justification for his figures than did Hartke. He argued that the
amendment, like various other amendments added the previous day, over-
loaded the bill, represented "Christmas in September," and was "an additional
straw that will break the back of the social security system."'" 3 Bennett also
argued that the amendment was the "wrong vehicle." Kidney disease was
being singled out for special treatment. "A more reasonable way to handle
this amendment," the Utah Republican argued, "would have been to delay
action until it can become part of a broader health insurance bill."" 4
Senator Russell B. Long, Democrat of Louisiana and floor manager of
H.R. 1 in his role as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, responded
to Bennett's last argument. 1
151
The next Congress will tackle health insurance issues, and I am sure during
that debate we will deal with health insurance problems in general, and I
hope that specifically we will deal with the problem of insuring against cata-
strophic illness. I am cosponsoring this proposal at this time because these very
unfortunate citizens with chronic renal failure cannot wait for Congress to
debate these broader issues. They need help-it is critical-and that help must
come now as many of them, without assistance, simply will not be alive for
another two years.
The medical means to deal with end-stage renal disease were at hand. One
should not, under such circumstances, pass up a legislative opportunity to act.
On January 11, 1973, Richard D. Lyons, a New York Times reporter, chal-
lenged the cost estimates that Hartke had used in the Senate debate. Based on
information supplied by HEW officials," Lyons wrote: 1
7
Original cost estimates ranged from S35 million to S75 million in the first
fiscal year of operation. The debate record in both houses shows thai the
highest estimate was $250 million in the fourth year. Yet calculations made by
101. Id.
102. id.
103. Id. at 33008.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 33009.
106. Interview with Ronald M. Klar, M.D., Washington, D.C. (July 10, 1973).
107. Lyons. Program to Aid Kidney Victims Faces Millions in Excess Costs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11,
1973, at 1.
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Federal experts after passage set first year costs at $135 million, rising to $1
billion annually a decade from now.
Lyons quoted several prominent Senators and Representatives to the effect
that they would not have supported the provision had they known the full
magnitude of the anticipated costs.
This story was the basis for a Sunday editorial-"Medicarelessness"--on
January 14, 1973, in which the New York Times criticized Congress for not
knowing what it was doing and for not recognizing the implications of its
decision. I" "
The point is not that victims of renal disease are unworthy of help, but that
Government resources have to be allocated to meeting many needs. If a bil-
lion dollars has to go to prolonging the lives of thousands of kidney disease
victims, that is a billion dollars that cannot go to eradicating slums, improving
education or finding a cure for cancer.
The editorial concluded by stating that "society has a right to expect that the
legislators will understand what they are doing and know the magnitude of
the commitment they are making when they pass special interest legislation,
whether for kidney disease sufferers or anybody else."
The implication that Congress was not fully informed in its action, though
challenged by the National Kidney Foundation, " " has achieved some cur-
rency. A 1975 report by the Subcommittee on Health and the Subcommittee
on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee developed the data
cited above in Table II on incurred costs of the end-stage renal disease pro-
gram, costs substantially greater than estimated by Senator Hartke.i " A more
recent report by the Subcommittee on Oversight explicitly juxtaposed the es-
timates for section 2991 only, which were available to the conferees and those
then available to the subcommittee for the third and fourth years of the pro-
gram in the manner demonstrated by Table HII LI The costs of section 2991, it
should be remembered, are estimated to be only 60 percent of all Medicare
renal costs. The estimated incurred costs for all renal patients for fiscal years
1976 and 1977 were $500 million and $600 million respectively, a far cry from
Senator Hartke's original estimates.
Did Congress know what it was doing when it passed section 2991 as part
of H.R.I? It is clear that the Congress was wrong on the cost estimates of the
end-stage renal disease provision. It is also the case that it did not inform
108. Medicarelessness, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
109. Altman, Kidney Fonndation Criticizes Articles on Care Costs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1973, at 30,
col. 5.
110. WAYS AND MEANS, BACKGROUND INFORMATION 15.
Ill. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94th CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION
BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OF THE END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE PROGRAM
ESTABLISHED BY PUBLIC LAW 92-603 (with additional views) and ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY
MEDICARE RESEARCH STUDIES 2 (Comm. Print 1975).
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TABLE III
ESTIMATED INCURRED COSTS OF SECTION 2991
THIRD AND FOURTH YEARS
1972 1975
Data available Revised
to conferees latest estimate
Fiscal Year (cash disbursement) (incurred cost)
1976 $198,000,000 $300,000,000
1977 $252,00,000 $360,000,000
Source: HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORTS ON ADMINISTRA-
TION BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OF THE END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE PROGRAM
ESTABLISHED BY PUBLIC LAW 92-603 (WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS) AND ON SOCIAL SECURITY MEDI-
CARE RESEARCH STUDIES 2 (Comm. Print 1975).
itself on the immediate issues through the process of legislative hearings on
the proposed amendment. But the lengthy policy debate on patient-care
financing was one to which many members of Congress had contributed. And
the Congress had received information on the need for financing patient-care
costs for kidney disease from the National Kidney Foundation, especially since
1969 when Dr. George E. Schreiner became president of the N.K.F. and
hired Mr. Charles Plante to represent its interests on Capitol Hill."1 2 Senator
Long, moreover, had introduced catastrophic health insurance legislation in
1970 and had been persuaded that end-stage renal disease was a special case
requiring catastrophic coverage well before September 1972. The Congress,
though perhaps not fully informed, was hardly without knowledge of the cen-
tral issues.
Are there circumstances under which the outcome might have been dif-
ferent? One can only speculate, but three situations deserve mention. First, if
there had been a thorough set of legislative hearings on the inclusion of end-
stage renal disease under Medicare coverage, a few votes on the provision
itself might have been changed. Whether the vote might have gone in the other
direction is impossible to say, but it is not likely that the provision would have
been defeated. Thorough hearings, however, would have deprived the Times
of much of the basis for its criticism. They also would have precluded the
development of Congressional grumbling, like that of the House Ways and
Means Committee, that a major, threshold crossing, precedent setting decision
was made in a casual legislative manner. Second, if better information had
112. The Kidney Care Issue: A Test for National Health Insurance, 8 Hosp. PRACTICE, April 1973,
at 40, 49-52, 59.
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been available on unit costs of therapy and aggregate costs to the Medicare
program, more Senators and Representatives would have paused before ap-
proving the amendment. It is easier to imagine that good cost information
would have had a greater effect than thorough legislative hearings alone
might have had, but again the impact on final outcome is speculative. Finally,
had the debate taken place in 1974, rather than in 1972, when the country
was in the midst of a severe recession, or in 1975, when concern for the
short-term and long-term financial viability of the social security system was
high, the concerns of Senator Bennett would have produced greater reso-
nance among other legislators. Whether these three conditions, singly or in
combination, might have resulted in a different outcome, however, is simply a
matter of conjecture.
V
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
How does this analysis of the policy debate on financing treatment for
victims of end-stage renal disease bear upon the proposition that society is
unwilling to sacrifice identified lives for dollars? Zeckhauser has argued that
the 1972 legislation establishing Medicare benefits for end-stage renal disease
was an instance of this reluctance. His formulation, quoted at the outset, is
worth quoting again:"
3
When risks of lives are involved, an important valued belief is that society will
not give up a life to save dollars, even a great many dollars. Rarely is this
belief, widely held albeit mistaken, put to a clear test. When it is, it may be
desirable for society to spend an inordinate amount on each of a few lives to
preserve a comforting myth. Such a myth-preserving action was taken when
the federal government assumed the costs of renal dialysis.
In the policy debate preceding enactment of Section 2991, the argument
was frequently made that life-saving therapy should not be denied because of
lack of money-and without doubt this argument was a powerful one. Its
power, however, should not be overestimated: only after more than a decade
of debate was a treatment payment program finally approved.
Over the entire length of the protracted debate there were always strong
voices of opposition to a treatment payment program. These voices were
found within the medical-scientific community, the executive branch, and the
legislative branch. Their opposition is eloquent testimony to the fact that pol-
icy makers are not always prepared to save lives at any cost. This opposition
often made its case in "sotto voce" fashion and argued against a treatment
payment program in some indirect fashion, e.g., renal dialysis was still an ex-
perimental procedure, dialysis treatment should be financed at the commu-
nity level, dialysis treatment should be financed only as part of a broad health
113. Zeckhauser, supra, note 4, at 447-48.
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insurance bill. The basic issue of the cost of financing dialysis treatment was,
however, always understood and sometimes explicitly stated, as in the New
York Times editorial comment that "the point is not that victims of renal dis-
ease are unworthy of help, but that Government resources have to be allo-
cated to meeting many needs."'' 4
The proponents of a treatment payment program were only able to
achieve their goal as a result of a complex and gradual process. A sequence of
federal government actions-involving financing of research and develop-
ment, demonstration, and capacity-building within HEW, and patient-care
financing of eligible veterans by the V.A.-set the stage for passage of section
2991. The deepening federal role was, in turn, the product of a number of
other processes, including the development of an identified group of physi-
cians, the cumulative effect of publicity, and the evolution of the federal role
in health in general. In short, although society is reluctant to sacrifice lives for
dollars, this reluctance did not swiftly and by its strength alone win federal
financing for the victims of end-stage renal disease.
What are the implications of the end-stage renal disease experience for
federal policy making relative to other catastrophic diseases? In 1973, a panel
of the Institute of Medicine expressed apprehension that the kidney disease
provision pointed in the direction of disease-by-disease coverage of cata-
strophic illness. The panel expressed "unanimous agreement that coverage of
discrete categories similar in kind to end-stage renal disease would be an in-
appropriate course to follow in the foreseeable future for providing expensive
care to those who are unable to afford it."'''1 5 Though the panel was stating a
legitimate concern, there was no disposition to move in the direction they
feared at the time of their report and there has been no action in that direc-
tion in the four years since the passage of the 1972 social security amend-
ments. Policy attention, instead, has been focused on including medical in-
surance for other forms of catastrophic disease in either catastrophic health
insurance legislation or in an even broader program of national health in-
surance. The federal role in health would appear to be more controlling of
policy determination than the existence of life-saving therapies to which
people are denied access because of cost.
On the other hand, were the debate over the form of national health
insurance-catastrophic or general-to remain unresolved over an extended
time, it is conceivable that pressures could mount in an irresistable manner to
do for hemophilia, for instance, what has been done for chronic kidney fail-
ure. The kidney experience, however, suggests that the probability of categor-
ical disease-by-disease action being taken Would be increased if a number of
other factors were present. First, the treatment would have to meet the crite-
114. N.Y. Tines, supra note 108.
115. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra, note 5, at 6-7.
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rion of being an established therapy, not merely an experimental procedure.
Then, the likelihood of patient-care financing would be increased if there had
been a prior set of partial government responses to the problem, responses
that stopped short of paying treatment costs. Third, the population of iden-
tified lives associated with the particular disease would have to grow to a point
where the number was politically significant and the plight of such individuals
was being continuously dramatized by print and broadcast media. Finally, the
probability of government action would be increased if, in addition to the
identified patients, there developed an identified set of institutions and group
of physicians responsible for providing the particular therapy. If these factors
were present, and the larger health insurance debate remained unresolved,
disease-by-disease action might be the pathway the country chose to follow.
Finally, an observation about the political process is in order. The policy
debate on end-stage renal disease, including the manner of its resolution,
suggests that the responsible public officials and professional elites experi-
enced a good deal of difficulty in discussing the question of "who shall live" in
a deliberative and public manner. Is the political system capable of openly
discussing its policy alternatives and making choices in such circumstances? Or
are such choices simply too divisive to be handled well by the polity? If they
are too divisive, we may expect vigorous debates on similar cases to be con-
ducted in the inner councils of medical-science and policy making institutions
but without extended public discussion. And perhaps we may also expect the
resolution of future debates to occur in the almost surreptitious manner wit-
nessed with respect to section 2991. But shielding important policy choices
from full and open public discussion robs those decisions of an important
measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the public. While financial costs of such
decisions may be substantial, the more elusive costs to the polity of choices
made without full public participation may be even greater. Perhaps the grow-
ing interest in and discussion of the ethical implications of biomedical re-
search, and the meaning and value of life and death, foreshadows a soci-
etal capability and willingness to deal with value-of-life questions in a public
manner.
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